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Corporate Venture Capital and its effects on company 









This paper examines the stock price reaction to the addition of corporate venture capital arms to 
publicly traded companies. Referencing venture capital resources, corporate press release 
announcements of the addition of CVC arms were hand collected. I calculate the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding press release announcement dates and find immediate 
stock market reactions, positively increasing stock prices compared to the overall market. I 
further perform placebo event studies at random dates and with direct competitors using the same 
announcement dates and find no significant results. These findings suggest that corporate venture 
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The venture capital industry is infamous for being difficult for individuals outside the 
industry to view its inner workings, due to the confidential nature of the work conducted and the 
private investments made. Academics have especially had difficulty trying to research the field 
due to the lack of available data. Although difficult to obtain data, the industry merits the need for 
strong academic research. Venture Capital (VC) firms provide capital to young firms that may be 
considered too risky for traditional modes of financing due to their uncertainty. To compensate for 
this, VC firms make equity-based investments, expecting significant returns. Over the past three 
decades, the industry has expanded rapidly and has become an important part of the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem and spurring important technological advances. 
According to preliminary research, Strebulaev and Gornall (2015) found that venture-
backed companies made up roughly 42% of all U.S. public companies founded after 1974, 
contributing to 59% of total taxes, 61% of total net income, 63% of total market capitalization, and 
85% of total R&D expenditure. Further, research conducted by the National Venture Capital 
Association (NVCA) found that 24% of all IPOs in between 2004-2019 were in fact venture-
backed.1 From 2010 to 2020, $779 billion of venture capital was also invested in the U.S., with an 
average of 5,665 deals every year.2 Although difficult to research, these results show the 
importance of venture capital to the broader economy and validate the importance to push forward 
research to better understand the industry and add to the greater body of literature.  
 
1  NVCA (2020). NVCA 2020 Yearbook (p. 34, Rep.). San Francisco, CA: National Venture Capital Association. 
https://nvca.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/NVCA-2020-Yearbook.pdf 






Corporate Venture Capital (CVC) arms of publicly traded companies present a unique 
opportunity to better understand the broader VC industry through the use of readily accessible 
financial data, but also present the opportunity for future areas of research to compare CVC firms 
to the traditional VC industry. Different from traditional VC firms, CVC arms are housed within 
corporations by either being an internal department of the company or owned as a separate 
subsidiary. Corporations will often deploy a CVC arm primarily for either strategic or financial 
reasons. 
A major reason for a CVC arm is to improve the company’s research and development 
efforts. Kortum and Lerner (2000) find that venture capital is three to four times more powerful 
than corporate research and development. Instead of running the risk of developing technology 
internally, firms may find it to be more advantageous to look externally and invest in small, focused 
companies to perform the work.  
Having a CVC arm also allows companies to continually evaluate new technological 
developments and potential competition. The traditional VC firm will review hundreds, if not 
thousands, of investments a year and will slowly narrow their pipeline to a handful of investments 
that reach fruition. Having an internal CVC arm allows corporations to continually learn of 
emerging market trends and ensure that the larger company avoids disruptive innovation. 
Finally, CVC arms can help fuel a corporation's M&A and business development activity. 
Benson and Ziedonis (2010) find that one of every five startups purchased by 61 top corporate 
investors from 1987 through 2003 were in fact the acquirer’s own venture portfolio companies. 
Further, Bradley and Sundaram (2006) find that acquisitions of non-public entities generated an 
aggregate gain of $222 billion in between 1990 and 2000, whereas the acquisitions of public targets 




an attractive option for acquisitions, because the companies are small enough to integrate easily, 
have not gathered significant assets that may be inapplicable to the acquirer, and are generally 
focused on emerging market trends.  
Although there are several reasons for why a corporation may want to add a venture capital 
arm to its operations, a question to ask is how do financial markets view companies when they add 
a CVC arm? Because of the potential strategic and financial benefits aforementioned, do investors 
view CVC firms as value-creating or does the taking on of additional risk lead to value-
destruction? This paper seeks to answer these questions and add to the growing body of VC and 
CVC literature. 
This paper analyzes the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding press release 
announcement dates of the addition of corporate venture capital arms to understand how CVC 
arms affect companies’ stock market valuation. The hypothesis set forth in this paper is that the 
announcement of the creation of CVC firms positively affect public companies’ stock market 
prices, thus increasing company valuation, and is viewed favorably by financial markets. The rest 
of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the data used throughout the study, Section 3 presents 
the empirical research methods and results, and Section 4 offers concluding remarks.   
 
2. DATA DESCRIPTION 
Data were hand collected by referencing corporate venture capital firms listed in PitchBook 
founded since the year 2000. Utilizing search engines, 23 publicly available corporate press 
releases documenting their announcement dates were gathered. Additional articles were found, 
which could have increased the overall sample size, however this paper restricts its sample to only 




paper, listing the public company’s name, its associated corporate venture capital arm, ticker, and 
sector. 
Following Table 1, Table 2 reports statistics that summarize the 23 sample companies with 
CVC announcement dates. Included in the table are the following statistics: MktCap as the market 
capitalization measured in thousands, and is calculated by multiplying the firm’s closing stock 
price by its total shares outstanding. Price as the closing stock price of each firm on the day of the 
CVC firm announcement. Volatility as a measure of range-based volatility as discussed in Alizadeh 
et al. (2002) and is calculated as the difference between the natural log of the highest price and the 
natural log of the lowest price during a particular year. Share Turnover as the ratio of trading 
volume scaled by shares outstanding for each firm. Spread as the difference between the bid and 
ask price of each stock (i.e. bid-ask spread), scaled by the midpoint average. Exchange as a dummy 
variable equaling one if the stock is listed on the NASDAQ stock exchange - zero if it is listed on 
the NYSE stock exchange. D/E as the debt-to-equity ratio measured as the amount of (annual) 
total liabilities scaled by (annual) total equity. Book to Market as the ratio of the book value of the 
firm at the announcement date to the market value of the firm. Revenue as the annual revenue of 
the company, measured in thousands. Asset Turnover as the ratio of total sales to total assets of the 
firm. Current Ratio as the ratio of current assets to current liabilities of the firm. 
MktCap, Exchange, D/E, Book to Market, Revenue, Asset Turnover, and Current Ratio are 
derived from annual data gathered from Standard & Poor’s Compustat financial database. Price, 
Volatility, Share Turnover, and Spread are derived from daily data from the Center for Research 
in Security Prices (CRSP).  
As seen in Table 2, the average firm had a market capitalization of $57 billion, closing 




equity ratio of 2.10, book-to-market ratio of 0.0003, annual revenue of $29 billion, asset turnover 
of 0.69, and current ratio of 2.04. Of the 23 companies, roughly 60% are NASDAQ-listed 
companies, while 40% are NYSE-listed. 
Like Table 1, Table 3 lists public competitor companies, which are used in Section 3.2 for 
placebo testing and later in Section 3.3 for a linear regression model. Table 4 reports the summary 
statistics for the 23 direct competitor companies without CVC announcement dates. As seen in the 
table, the average firm had a market capitalization of $62 billion, closing price of $84.51, volatility 
of 0.03, share turnover of 12.69, bid-ask spread of 0.0029, debt-to-equity ratio of 2.52, book-to-
market ratio of 0.0005, annual revenue of $43 billion, asset turnover of 0.92, and a current ratio of 
1.82. Of the 23 companies, roughly 26% are NASDAQ listed companies, while 74% are NYSE-
listed. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL TESTS 
3.1 Cumulative Abnormal Returns event studies 
To understand what effect the announcements of CVC arm additions have to companies’ 
valuation, this paper observes the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of various event windows 
surrounding the announcement dates of the 23 sample companies in Table 1. CARs are derived 
from a market model estimated during a defined pre-event period. The market model is specified 
in the following way: 
(1)  Ri,t = α + βRmt + εi,t 
R is the return for stock i on day t and Rm is either the CRSP equally-weighted or value-
weighted index on day t. The α and β parameters are estimated using a pre-event period ending 46 




returns. Utilizing the market model during the pre-event period, I estimate the following model for 
expected return for stock i on day t: 
(2)  𝐸[𝑅𝑖,𝑡] =  ?̂? + ?̂?  × 𝑅𝑚𝑡 
Afterwards, I calculate the “abnormal return” (AR) by taking the difference between the actual 
return for stock i on day t and the expected return: 
(3)  𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑖,𝑡] 
Summing all firm-specific abnormal returns, I obtain the “cumulative” abnormal returns for each 






 In Table 5, six event windows were used in both the equally-weighted (Panel A) and value-
weighted (Panel B) panels. The event windows are listed in parentheses notation with negative 
values illustrating days before the event date, zero being the event date, and positive values 
illustrating days after the event date. For instance, the event window (-1,-1) indicates the day before 
the CVC arm announcement; (0,0) indicates the day of the announcement; (-1,1) indicates the day 
before, through the day after the announcement; (0,1) indicates the day of the announcement 
through the day after; (0,5) indicates the announcement date through the fifth day after the event; 
and (0,10) indicates the announcement date through the tenth day after the event. These six event 
windows were also used in additional tables that will be discussed later in the paper.  
 To determine the effect of CVC arm addition announcements on company valuation, 
Columns [1] and [2] in Table 5 are the most illustrative. In Panel A, Column [1] is the day before 
the announcement date and the mean CARs for the 23 sample stocks is 0.37% (t-statistic = 1.014), 




[2] is the day of the announcement date and the mean CARs for the 23 sample stocks is 0.99% (t-
statistic = 3.183), almost a full percentage above the CRSP equally-weighted market index return, 
being statistically significant at the 0.001 level, indicating that the CVC announcement dates had 
an immediate impact on stock prices, increasing the company valuation.  
Column [3] illustrates the day before and the day after the announcement date and the mean 
CARs for the event window is 2.37% (t-statistic = 4.108), the strongest of all windows and is again 
statistically significant at the 0.001 level.  
Columns [4], [5], and [6] are used to illustrate the longer-term effects of the CVC 
announcement dates. Column [4] is the event window between the announcement date and the day 
after, resulting in a mean CARs of 1.78% (t-statistic = 3.692), significant at the 0.001 level. 
Column [5] is five days after the announcement date and Column [6] is ten days after the 
announcement date, and the mean CARs are 1.30% (t-statistic = 2.969) and 2.05% (t-statistic = 
2.945), respectively, statistically significant at the 0.01 level, indicating that the CVC 
announcement date had a relatively long-term effect on the 23 stocks’ company valuation, when 
compared to the overall market. 
  For robustness, Panel B of Table 5 uses the same market model as illustrated in equation 
(1), however, a value-weighted market index is used when estimating CARs . Similar CAR results 
are seen across all event windows, with consistent significant levels. Column [1], the day before 
the CVC announcement date, results in a mean CARs of 0.30% (t-statistic = 0.522) and the value 
is again statistically insignificant. Column [2], the day of the announcement date, provides a mean 




For further robustness, an additional event study was performed, utilizing the Fama-French 
model to estimate the cumulative abnormal returns of the 23 CVC announcement dates with results 
listed in Table 6. The Fama-French model is specified in the following way: 
(5)  𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
R is the return for stock i on day t and Rm is again either the CRSP equally-weighted or 
value-weighted index on day t. SMB is the small minus large market capitalization risk factor to 
control for company size and HML is the high minus low book-to-market risk factor to control for 
either value or growth stocks. The α and β parameters are estimated using a pre-event period. 
Utilizing the Fama-French model during the pre-event period, I estimate the following model to 
calculate the expected return for stock i on day t: 
(6)  𝐸[𝑅𝑖,𝑡] = ?̂? + 𝛽1̂ × 𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝛽2̂ × 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3̂ × 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  
Similar to Table 5, I calculate the abnormal return by taking the difference between the 
actual return for stock i on day t and the expected return as illustrated in equation (3) and sum all 
firm-specific abnormal returns to obtain the cumulative abnormal returns as illustrated in equation 
(4).  
Consistent with the cross-sectional event study in Table 5, all columns for Table 6 but 
Column [1] are statistically significant, with the majority of the mean CARs from both panels 
being higher than the values from Table 5. Column [1], the day before the announcement date, 
resulted in 0.37% (t-statistic = 0.670) and 0.26% (t-statistic = 0.371) mean CARs for Panel A and 
Panel B, respectively, both being statistically insignificant. Column [2], the day of the 
announcement date, resulted in 1.13% (t-statistic = 3.494) and 1.09% (t-statistic = 3.652) mean 




These results further support the hypothesis that the addition of CVC arms positively influence 
companies’ stock prices, and thus their market valuation.  
3.2 Placebo tests 
 Alternative to the hypothesis above, it would be expected that companies without CVC 
arm announcements would not have any significant changes to their stock prices. Results in the 
previous subsection could be explained by other spurious reasons. To evaluate this possibility, 23 
direct competitors to the companies listed in Table 1 were gathered and are listed in Table 3.  Table 
4 replicates Table 2 and reports statistics that summarize the 23 sample competitors.  
Using these 23 competitor companies, a similar cross-sectional event study to Table 5 was 
conducted to observe the CARs surrounding the same CVC announcement dates as the companies 
listed in Table 1. If the results in the previous subsection are indeed spurious, then CARs of 
competitors should also be positive and significant. The results of this event study are found in 
Table 7, using the same event windows found in Table 5. As expected, all event windows’ mean 
CARs are statistically insignificant. Column [1] of Panel A, the day before Table 1’s CVC 
announcement dates, resulted in a mean CARs of -0.38% (t-statistic = -0.024) and Column [2], the 
day of Table 1’s CVC announcement dates, resulted in a -0.27% mean CARs (t-statistic = -0.201). 
These results further support the hypothesis that the announcement of CVC arm additions 
positively influence companies’ stock prices and the absence of such announcements, as shown in 
Table 7, should have no effect on a company’s stock price. 
To provide further robustness, an additional cross-sectional placebo event study was 
conducted using the sample of original companies listed in Table 1. In Table 8, randomized dates 
were generated to calculate daily mean CARs to compare to the results found in Table 5 Column 




Panel B. Of the 20 results from both panels, three out of the 10 CARs in Panel A and four out of 
the 10 CARs in Panel B were statistically significant at the 0.05 level. However, the majority of 
the resulting mean CARs were statistically insignificant. The average of the 10 tests for Panel A 
resulted in a -0.14% mean CARs (average t-statistic = -0.915) and the average of the 10 tests for 
Panel B resulted in a -0.16% mean CARs (average t-statistic = -1.099), both being statistically and 
economically insignificant. These results show that there is little probability that the results found 
in Table 5 would be statistically significant at random, especially at the 0.001 level, further 
supporting the hypothesis that announcements of CVC arm additions positively influence 
companies’ stock prices. 
 
3.3 OLS Linear Regression Model 
 To better understand what is driving the positive CARs surrounding the CVC arm 
announcement dates, a linear regression model was created to isolate various effects and control 
for multiple factors. Table 9 reports results of several variations of the following regression model: 
 
(6)  𝐶𝐴𝑅(0,0)  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝑉𝐶𝑖 +  𝛽2 𝑙𝑛(𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑙𝑛(𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝)𝑖,𝑡 +  
𝛽4 𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑙𝑛(𝐷/𝐸)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑙𝑛(𝐵/𝑀)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
The dependent variable in this regression is the CARs of the CVC arm announcement dates. 
Included in the analysis are the 23 companies that announced CVC arm additions and the 23 direct 
competitors without CVC arm announcements, making a total of 46 CARs, or 46 observations. 
CVC is a dummy variable equaling one or zero, being one if the company announced a CVC arm 
addition – zero if the firm is a CVC firm competitor. ln(ShareTurn) is the natural log of share 




is the natural log of the market capitalization of the given stock. ln(Spread) is the natural log of 
the bid-ask spread, scaled by the midpoint average. ln(D/E) is the natural log of the debt-to-equity 
ratio, measured as total liabilities scaled by total equity. ln(B/M) is the natural log of the company’s 
total equity scaled by the total market capitalization, or the book-to-market ratio.  
Column [1] of Table 9 is a simple linear regression, only including CVC as an independent 
variable. The regression results in a positive coefficient, 0.0127 (t-statistic = 2.32) , which is 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. This indicates that companies that announced CVC arm 
additions experienced positive 1.27% CARs greater than competitors that did not announce CVC 
arm additions.  
Columns [2] through [6] individually add additional control variables to CVC to identify 
which other variables have significant impact on cumulative abnormal returns. Columns [2] and 
[3] indicate that share turnover and company market capitalization do not significantly affect 
whether or not a company experiences significant cumulative abnormal returns. Column [4] 
includes company stock Spread, which has a negative coefficient of -0.025 (t-statistic = -4.08). 
This shows a strong relationship between a stock’s spread and its CARs and that as spread 
increases, CARs decrease. This intuitively makes sense, because as the spread widens, this would 
make the stock more illiquid and could decrease the stock price to compensate. Column [5] 
includes company Debt-to-Equity ratio, which has a positive coefficient of 0.006 (t-statistic = 
2.11). This shows that as a company increases its debt or decreases its equity, it can expect a higher 
CAR when announcing a CVC arm addition. Column [6] includes the company Book-to-Market 
ratio, which has a negative coefficient of -0.008 (t-statistic = -2.82), indicating that as the equity 
book value increases or market capitalization decreases, companies can expect a decrease in CARs. 




capitalization that were not captured in Column [2]. After individually including all variables, as 
illustrated in Columns [2] through [6], the dummy variable CVC remains statistically significant 
in each instance and remains positive.  
Column [7] of Table 9 includes all of the aforementioned variables and is the full 
representation of model (6). After including all other control variables together, the variable CVC 
is still statistically significant with a positive coefficient of 0.0139 (t-statistic = 2.57), being 
significant at the 0.01 level. This model results in a R-squared of 0.50 and an adjusted R-squared 
of 0.42, explaining 42% of the variation of the data set. These results further support the hypothesis 
that announcements of CVC arm additions positively influence company stock prices, while 
controlling for multiple factors, and add to the results found in sections 3.1 and 3.2. 
All specifications of the model use robust standard errors to account for possible 
heteroskedasticity. Further, Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) testing was conducted to ensure no 
multicollinearity issues.  
 
4. CONCLUSION 
In this study, I find strong evidence supporting the hypothesis that the announcement of 
CVC arms positively influence stock market prices of the parent company.  These findings are 
important for several reasons. First, it helps us understand how the broader financial market 
perceives venture capital. Second, it provides context for company executives to ensure they are 
aligned in their purpose to maximize shareholder value when considering CVC arm additions.  
Results show that before the announcement date of CVC firms, the companies involved in 
the cross-sectional event study did not experience significant returns, however, the day of the CVC 




3.183) and 1.04% value-weighted CAR (t-statistic = 3.446), both significant at the 0.001 level. 
The day after yielded a 1.78% equally-weighted CAR (t-statistic = 3.692) and 1.97% value-
weighted CAR (t-statistic = 3.598), both again significant at the 0.001 level. To ensure robustness, 
a Fama-French model event study was also conducted, which yielded even stronger CARs, with 
similar significance levels. 
Additionally, the study demonstrates alternative placebo testing to compare the initial 
results to (i) competing firms on the actual CVC event dates, and (ii) the sample CVC firms on 
randomized event dates. Results from the placebo tests do not find  statistically significant CARs 
on the actual event dates for competitor companies, illustrating that there were likely no industry 
or economic timing factors. The tests also show that while some of the randomized event dates 
generate some statistically significant CARs for companies announcing CVC additions, the 
magnitude is much lower and is often negative instead of positive.  
The analysis concludes with a multilinear regression model combining both the CVC arm 
announcement firms and the direct competitor firms to observe if there were any other factors 
contributing to the CARs on the announcement date.  CVC is included as a dummy variable to 
indicate which companies announced a CVC arm addition to understand what effect the 
announcement had, when controlling for other factors. Other variables included are share turnover, 
market capitalization, bid-ask spread, debt-to-equity ratio, and book-to-market ratio. After 
controlling for these factors, I find that CVC produces a coefficient of 0.0139 (t-statistic = 2.57), 
which is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This indicates that companies that announced a 
CVC arm addition experienced on average 1.39% greater CARs than competitor companies that 




These findings contribute to the broader literature and provide important context as 
corporate venture capital continues to grow. Additional areas of research of corporate venture 
capital could be to compare how traditional VC compares to CVC and determining the long term 
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Table 1 - Companies announcing CVC arm additions 
Company Name CVC Firm Ticker Sector 
 [1] [2] [3] 
Honeywell Honeywell Ventures HON Industrial Conglomerate 
Workday Workday Ventures WDAY Software 
Concur Concur Perfect Trip Fund CNQR Software 
Kraft Heinz Co Evolv Ventures KHC Packaged Foods 
Kellogg Co Eighteen94 Capital K Packaged Foods 
General Mills Inc 301 Inc GIS Packaged Foods 
UnitedHealth Group Optum Ventures UNH Healthcare 
Mellanox Mellanox Capital MLNX Communication Equipment 
Ryder RyderVentures R Rental & Leasing Services 
Symantec Symantec Ventures SYMC Software  
KLA Tencor Corp KT Venture Group KLAC Semiconductors 
Cigna Corp Cigna Ventures CI Healthcare 
Qualcomm Inc Qualcomm Ventures QCOM Semiconductors 
Tyson Foods Inc Tyson Ventures TSN Packaged Foods 
DaVita Inc DaVita Ventures DVA Healthcare 
Jones Lang LaSalle Inc JLL Spark JLL Real Estate 
Amazon.Com Inc Amazon Alexa Fund AMZN Internet Retail 
Intuitive Surgical Inc Intuitive Ventures ISRG Healthcare 
JetBlue Airways Corp JetBlue Technology Ventures JBLU Airlines 
Alphabet Inc Gradient Ventures GOOGL Internet Content & Information 
Nasdaq Inc Nasdaq Ventures NDAQ Financial Services 
Amgen Inc Amgen Ventures AMGN Healthcare 






Table 2 – Summary Statistics 
  
The table reports statistics that describe the sample of the 23 public firms collected from the collected press releases. 
MktCap is market capitalization for each firm in each year, measured in thousands. Price is the closing stock price 
of each firm on the day of the CVC firm announcement. Volatility is a measure of range-based volatility discussed 
in Alizadeh et al. (2002) and is calculated as the difference between the natural log of the highest price and the 
natural log of the lowest price during a particular year. Share Turnover is the ratio of trading volume scaled by 
shares outstanding for each firm. Spread is the bid-ask spread, scaled by the midpoint average. D/E is the debt-to-
equity ratio measured as the amount of (annual) total liabilities scaled by (annual) total equity. Book to Market is 
the ratio of the book value of the firm at the announcement date to the market value of the firm. Revenue is the 
annual revenue of the company, measured in thousands. Asset Turnover is the ratio of total sales to total assets of 
the firm. Current Ratio is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities of the firm.  
 
 Mean Standard Dev. 25th Percentile Median 75th Percentile 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
MktCap 57,208,997  77,128,813  7,591,033  18,745,204  65,726,102  
Price 162.68 225.68 56.54 80.96 127.08 
Volatility 0.12 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.12 
Share Turnover 2.18 1.94 1.20 1.50 2.34 
Spread 0.00027 0.00087 0.00012 0.00029 0.00048 
Exchange 0.6 0.5 0.0 1.0 1.0 
D/E 2.10 1.82 0.57 1.67 3.16 
Book to Market 0.0003 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0005 
Revenue 29,121,000 48,487 3,591 8,420 31,575 
Asset Turnover 0.69 0.41 0.38 0.65 0.85 




Table 3 - Competitors 
CVC Company Name Competitor Name Ticker Sector 
 [1] [2] [3] 
Honeywell Johnson Controls JCI Industrial Conglomerate 
Workday SAP SAP Software 
Concur Intuit INTU Software 
Kraft Heinz Co Mondelez International MDLZ Packaged Foods 
Kellogg Co General Mills GIS Packaged Foods 
General Mills Inc Kellog K Packaged Foods 
UnitedHealth Group Anthem ANTM Healthcare 
Mellanox Broadcom AVGO Communication Equipment 
Ryder XPO Logistics XPO Rental & Leasing Services 
Symantec Palo Alto Networks PANW Software  
KLA Tencor Corp Applied Materials AMAT Semiconductors 
Cigna Corp Molina Healthcare MOH Healthcare 
Qualcomm Inc Advanced Micro Devices AMD Semiconductors 
Tyson Foods Inc Hormel Foods Corp HRL Packaged Foods 
DaVita Inc HCA Healthcare HCA Healthcare 
Jones Lang LaSalle Inc CBRE Group CBRE Real Estate 
Amazon.Com Inc Walmart WMT Retail 
Intuitive Surgical Inc Medtronic MDT Healthcare 
JetBlue Airways Corp Delta DAL Airlines 
Alphabet Inc Microsoft MSFT Internet Content & Information 
Nasdaq Inc MarketAxess MKTX Financial Services 
Amgen Inc Eli Lilly LLY Healthcare 





Table 4 – Competitor Summary Statistics 
  
The table reports statistics that describe the sample of the 23 competitor public firms to the companies listed in 
Table 1. MktCap is market capitalization for each firm in each year, measured in thousands. Price is the closing 
stock price of each firm on the day of the CVC firm announcement. Volatility is a measure of range-based volatility 
discussed in Alizadeh et al. (2002) and is calculated as the difference between the natural log of the highest price 
and the natural log of the lowest price during a particular year. Share Turnover is the ratio of trading volume scaled 
by shares outstanding for each firm in each year. D/E is the debt-to-equity ratio measured as the amount of (annual) 
total liabilities scaled by (annual) total equity.  Book to Market is the ratio of the book value of the firm at the 
announcement date to the market value of the firm. Revenue is the annual revenue of the company, measured in 
thousands. Asset Turnover is the ratio of total sales to total assets of the firm. Current Ratio is the ratio of current 
assets to current liabilities of the firm.  
 
 Mean Standard Dev. 25th Percentile Median 75th Percentile 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
MktCap 62,487,024 115,912,548 11,552,083 25,461,367 48,116,019 
Price 84.51 52.22 45.38 69.99 105.84 
Volatility 0.0301 0.0337 0.0126 0.0185 0.0310 
Share Turnover 12.69 17.24 3.86 5.87 11.09 
Spread 0.0029 0.0125 0.0001 0.0002 0.0004 
Exchange 0.26 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.50 
D/E 2.52 3.17 0.80 1.48 2.85 
Book to Market 0.00053 0.00125 0.00016 0.00025 0.00037 
Revenue 43,892,000 98,865 9,544 16,252 29,543 
Asset Turnover 0.92 0.59 0.53 0.77 1.05 






Table 5 – Cross-Sectional Event Study – CARs Surrounding CVC arm additions 
 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are from a market model estimated during the pre-event period. The market 
model is specified in the following way: 
 
Ri,t = α + βRmt + εi,t 
 
Where R is the return for stock i on day t and Rm is the CRSP value-weighted index on day t. After estimating the 
market model during the pre-event period, I obtain estimates for ε, which is the firm-specific return, or the 
“abnormal” return. I then sum these abnormal returns for various time windows surrounding the addition dates of 
corporate venture capital arms. T-statistics, which determine whether or not CARs are significantly different from 
zero, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A - Equally-Weighted Index 
 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
 CAR(-1,-1) CAR(0,0) CAR(-1,1) CAR(0,1) CAR(0,5) CAR(0,10) 
Mean CARs 0.59% 0.99%*** 2.37%*** 1.78%*** 1.30%** 2.05%** 




0.25% 0.99% 2.00% 1.75% 1.67% 2.50% 
       
T-statistic (1.014) (3.183) (4.108) (3.692) (2.969) (2.945) 
       
N 23 23 23 23 23 23 
       
       
Panel B - Value-Weighted Index    
       
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
 CAR(-1,-1) CAR(0,0) CAR(-1,1) CAR(0,1) CAR(0,5) CAR(0,10) 
Mean CARs 0.30% 1.04%*** 1.97%*** 1.67%*** 0.88%** 1.94%** 




0.12% 0.96% 1.72% 1.59% 1.29% 2.27% 
       
T-statistic (0.522) (3.446) (4.022) (3.598) (2.405) (2.621) 
       







Table 6 – Fama-French Event Study – CARs Surrounding CVC firm additions 
 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are from the Fama-French model estimated during the pre-event period. The 
Fama-French  model is specified in the following way: 
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where R is the return for stock i on day t and Rm is the CRSP value-weighted index on day t, SMB is the small 
minus large market capitalization risk factor to control for company size on day t, and HML is the high minus low 
book-to-market risk factor to control for either value or growth stocks on day t. After estimating the market model 
during the pre-event period, I obtain estimates for ε, which is the firm-specific return, or the “abnormal” return. I 
then sum these abnormal returns for various time windows surrounding the addition dates of corporate venture 
capital arms. T-statistics, which determine whether or not CARs are significantly different from zero, are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A - Equally-Weighted Index 
 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
 CAR(-1,-1) CAR(0,0) CAR(-1,1) CAR(0,1) CAR(0,5) CAR(0,10) 
Mean CARs 0.37% 1.13%*** 2.24%*** 1.87%*** 0.88%** 2.30%** 




0.15% 0.97% 1.86% 1.70% 1.28% 2.35% 
       
T-statistic (0.670) (3.494) (4.148) (3.618) (2.412) (2.945) 
       
N 23 23 23 23 23 23 
 
Panel B - Value-Weighted 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
 CAR(-1,-1) CAR(0,0) CAR(-1,1) CAR(0,1) CAR(0,5) CAR(0,10) 
Mean CARs 0.26% 1.09%*** 2.00%*** 1.75%*** 0.79%* 1.86%** 




0.08% 0.95% 1.66% 1.57% 1.11% 2.05% 
       
T-statistic  (0.371) (3.652) (3.913) (3.458) (2.136) (2.392) 
       





Table 7 – Competitor Cross-Sectional Tests – Placebo CARs Surrounding CVC arm addition dates 
 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are from a market model estimated during the pre-event period. The market 
model is specified in the following way: 
 
Ri,t = α + βRmt + εi,t 
 
Where R is the return for stock i on day t and Rm is the CRSP value-weighted index on day t. After estimating the 
market model during the pre-event period, I obtain estimates for ε, which is the firm-specific return, or the 
“abnormal” return. I then sum these abnormal returns for various time windows surrounding the addition dates of 
corporate venture capital arms. T-statistics, which determine whether or not CARs are significantly different from 
zero, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A - Equally-Weighted Index 
 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
 CAR(-1,-1) CAR(0,0) CAR(-1,1) CAR(0,1) CAR(0,5) CAR(0,10) 
Mean CARs -0.38% -0.27% -0.36% 0.02% 0.73% 1.12% 




-0.02% -0.07% 0.07% 0.10% 0.45% 0.75% 
       
T-statistic (-0.024) (-0.201) (0.087) (0.195) (0.850) (0.920) 
       
N 23 23 23 23 23 23 
       
       
Panel B - Value-Weighted Index    
       
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
 CAR(-1,-1) CAR(0,0) CAR(-1,1) CAR(0,1) CAR(0,5) CAR(0,10) 
Mean CARs -0.58% -0.27% -0.74% -0.16% 0.35% 1.00% 




-0.09% -0.13% -0.12% -0.01% 0.17% 0.72% 
       
T-statistic (-0.141) (-0.416) (-0.158) (-0.030) (0.342) (0.872) 
       





Table 8 – Placebo Cross-Sectional Tests – CARs surrounding randomized dates 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are from a market model estimated during the pre-event period. The market model is specified in the following way: 
Ri,t = α + βRmt + εi,t 
Where R is the return for stock i on day t and Rm is either the CRSP equally-weighted or value-weighted index on day t, by panel respectively. After estimating 
the market model during the pre-event period, I obtain estimates for ε, which is the firm-specific return, or the “abnormal” return. I then sum these abnormal 
returns for various time windows surrounding the addition dates of corporate venture capital arms. T-statistics, which determine whether or not CARs are 
significantly different from zero, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A - Equally-Weighted Index 
 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] Average 
 CAR(0,0) CAR(0,0) CAR(0,0) CAR(0,0) CAR(0,0) CAR(0,0) CAR(0,0) CAR(0,0) CAR(0,0) CAR(0,0) CAR(0,0) 
Mean CARs -0.22%* 0.40% -0.56% -0.19% -0.66%* -0.42% -0.16% 0.10% 0.48%* -0.20% -0.14% 




-0.39% 0.25% -0.60% -0.23% -0.43% -0.47% -0.16% 0.04% 0.39% -0.02% -0.16% 
            
T-statistic (-1.744) (0.956) (-0.828) (-0.436) (-1.677) (-0.818) (-0.503) (0.178) (1.939) (-0.070) (-0.915) 
            
N 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
 
Panel B - Value-Weighted Index 
 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] Average 
 CAR(0,0) CAR(0,0) CAR(0,0) CAR(0,0) CAR(0,0) CAR(0,0) CAR(0,0) CAR(0,0) CAR(0,0) CAR(0,0) CAR(0,0) 
Mean CARs -0.26%* 0.61%* -0.61% -0.27% -0.74%* -0.43% -0.24% -0.03% 0.52%* -0.19% -0.16% 




-0.34% 0.45% -0.66% -0.28% -0.53% -0.40% -0.24% 0.02% 0.40% 0.01% -0.16% 
            
T-statistic (-1.657) (1.969) (-0.894) (-0.551) (-2.211) (-0.766) (-0.768) (0.126) (1.998) (0.049) (-1.099) 
            






Table 9 – OLS Regressions: CARs modeling with CVC Firms and Competitors 
         
CAR(0,0)i,t = β0 + β1CVCi  + β2ln(ShareTurn)i,t + β3ln(MktCap)i,t + β4ln(Spread)i,t + β5ln(D/E)i,t + β6ln(B/M)i,t  + ei,t  
 
CVC is a dummy variable equaling one or zero, being one if the company announced a CVC arm addition - zero if not. ln(ShareTurn) is the natural log of share 
turnover and is the ratio of trading volume, scaled by shares outstanding for each firm. ln(MktCap) is the natural log of the market capitalization of the given stock. 
ln(Spread) is the natural log of the bid-ask spread, scaled by the midpoint average. ln(D/E) is the natural log of the debt-to-equity ratio, measured as total liabilities 
scaled by total equity. ln(B/M) is the natural log of the company’s total equity scaled by the total market capitalization, or the book-to-market ratio. MktCap, D/E, 
and B/M, were derived from annual data from Compustat and ShareTurn and Spread were derived from daily CRSP data. I report t-statistics (in parentheses) from 
robust standard errors.  $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the  0.10, 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
        
CVC 0.0127* 0.009$ 0.0130* 0.009* 0.0140** 0.0125* 0.0139** 
 (2.32) (1.49) (2.37) (2.03) (2.69) (2.48) (2.57) 
        
ln(ShareTurn)  -0.003     0.002 
  (-0.53)     (0.77) 
        
ln(MktCap)   0.002    -0.000 
   (0.74)    (-0.15) 
        
ln(Spread)    -0.025***   -0.023*** 
    (-4.08)   (-4.35) 
        
ln(D/E)     0.006*  0.004$ 
     (2.11)  (1.88) 
        
ln(B/M)      -0.008** -0.006** 
      (-2.82) (-2.80) 
        
R2 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.36 0.21 0.23 0.50 
Adj. R2       0.42 
Robust SEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
 
